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Abstract
The goal of this paper was to identify the reasons behind the
supply for free of labor in a world where rationality requires peo-
ple to avoid resource misallocation and to care mainly for their
own welfare. We based the identification strategy on simple
consumption and investment models with a focus on developing
countries for the empirical part. Using some probability models
and estimation techniques , we found an ambiguous coexistence
of both intrinsic and extrinsic motives for volunteering.
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1 Introduction
Thinking economically, a scarce resource has to be priced. In particular, the
supply of labor services entering the production process should be priced at least
at the marginal product of labor in a competitive market. However, it is common
to see some labor services supplied for ”free” either in order to provide health as-
sistance, educational support or for the provision of some other services. At a first
glance volunteering might seem ”irrational” economically speaking . Nevertheless
there are some precise motivations behind it and the nature of those motives has
instigated many studies. The majority of the studies were aimed at modeling both
the volunteer’s attitude regarding the supply of his services and the potential returns
(pecuniary or moral satisfaction) derived from it. In parallel other empirical studies
resulted in some evidences about the existence of different types of motives which
could get altered depending on the specificities of the considered contexts. We re-
view those studies later on. Conceptually, there is no consensus on what a voluntary
∗I’m grateful to Paul Seabright for his advice and comments. All typos or persistent errors are
mine. Any comment is welcome at modeste.daye@unamur.be
activity or volunteering really means. Five key elements 2 have been identified in
order to circumscribe the concept:
• The reward: whether it is a pure altruistic behavior or not;
• The free will: there should be no compulsion when engaging in those activities;
• The nature of the benefit: Is the beneficiary a stranger or not to the supplier?
• Organizational setting: Is the service provided via a formal setting or not?
• The level of commitment of the volunteer.
Similarly, depending on how people volunteer or considering the relevant motives
behind their choices one can also sort volunteering in different categories. I go over
the details on this in the literature review.
One clear fact is that volunteering happens both in developing and developed
countries suggesting that there might exist both some economic and non- economic
incentives (moral satisfaction, experience, social network,...) behind it . In fact,
a satisfaction could be derived from the act of volunteering per se and /or some
experience coupled with a social capital could be built. An additional work experi-
ence plus an extended social network could in fact strengthen a potential volunteer’s
human capital , increasing thereby his prospects of income and employment. Any
voluntary activity involves some supply of labor services without necessarily im-
plying some immediate reward or clear motives especially in the presence of some
constraints. It is hence interesting to identify not only the main reasons driving a
voluntary activity but also to distinguish pure altruistic behavior and the ”warm-
glow”3 motives from the signaling motives considering the main characterictics of
the social and economic environment. While concerning the former motives , the
volunteers derive some internal or intrinsic benefits just due to the fact that they are
volunteering, the latter in fact focus on the future returns which their involvement
into voluntary activities could generate (extrinsic benefits4) .
In such a setting, we want to check whether people volunteer because they enjoy
it per se or because they are just investing for prospective job opportunities, image
concerns or anticipated need of assistance from other people in the future . The
study is based on developing countries and focuses on the extensive margins5 of
2Volunteering and Social Development A Background Paper for Discussion at an Expert Group
Meeting New York, November 29-30, 1999 United Nations Volunteers.
3James Andreoni (1989).
4experience, know-how, social network...
5whether people decide to enter in volunteering or not.
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volunteering decisions. Table 1 below displays an example of a priori altruistic
behavior.
Table 1: Would give part of my income for the environment
Item Number Per cent
Strongly agree 7,164 21
Agree 16,789 50
Disagree 7,237 22
Strongly disagree 2,310 7
Total 33,500 100
Source:WVS
As can be seen from tables 8 and 9 in annex , both type of employed and un-
employed people volunteer and at the same time there seems to be in proportion
more rich people favorable to volunteering as compared to lower income scale people
(table 9) . Nevertheless, this is only a simple association between those variables
and we cannot pretend to draw any relevant pattern from it.
The appropriate methodological approach to address the question raised here
would be developed later on in the theoretical and empirical strategy section after
going through a review of the literature. The rest of the work thus consists in going
through the literature, positing the identification strategy and presenting the results
while discussing each of them.
2 Literature review
Roy and Ziemek (2000) argued that the motives of volunteerism could be modeled
by either
• The Public Goods Model with the supply of public service or support for civic
action
• The Private Consumption Model to account for the joy from the act of volun-
teering: this deals with the ’warm-glow’ utility;
• The Impure Altruism Model which synthesizes the two previous models and
• The Investment Model which supports the gain of labor market experience,
skills and networks.
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In their paper ”Volunteering as a weird way of making money” Hackl et al (2007)
divided the literature of the motivational reasons to volunteer into three broad fam-
ilies which could be summarized into two. On the one hand we have the intrinsic
motives focusing on the internal rewards derived from volunteering. This group is
argued to be heeded by the consumption motives. On the other hand the motives for
volunteering are not the act itself per se but rather the underlying external benefits
or returns . This category of motives for volunteering belongs to the investment
motives class. Altruism which is not easy to clarify is thought to be accounted for
by the consumption motives. Hackl et al (2007)’s analysis indeed focused on the two
types of motives and found some significant evidence of investment motives using
the Upper Austrian Census built in 2001 . In Meier (2006) some examples have
been provided to illustrate the intrinsic motivators for volunteering. In fact , when
some individuals care for some others’ well-being and are happy due to the results of
their efforts (in volunteering), or see their self-determination reinforced, the motives
are termed intrinsic and are dealt with in the consumption model.
However, in the presence of incentives, some biases might make it difficult to
really disentangle altruistic pro-social behaviors and the constrained ones. In that
respect, Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) pointed out that when honor and /or stigma are
the main reputational concern in a society , extrinsic incentives (rewards and pun-
ishment) might crowd out some altruistic pro-social behaviors. Elaborating more
on the issue raised above, Seabright (2009) identified two types of discontinuities
regarding an altruistic behavior. A discontinuity might indeed come from the dis-
tribution of the types of people concerning their willingness to accept rewards as
a counterpart of their altruistic behavior and the other one consists basically in a
crowding out effect. The first type of discontinuity comes from the fact that for an
altruist, it is more worthwhile to offer the service for free than getting a payment
as reward. The second arises from the fact people find it less worthwhile selling
the services for a positive amount of money although they are ready to provide the
service for free. So the presence of incentives shed a light on how people shape their
behavior while deciding to volunteer .
An empirical implementation of the effects of incentives has been conducted by
Carpenter and Myers (2010). They have performed an experiment in a context
where people could volunteer to be a firefighter. They found that altruism and
reputational concerns are key in the decision to volunteer and moreover positively
correlated with it. However, this effect seems to disappear when there are some
variations in stipends incentives.
Focusing on the relationship between Volunteering and Happiness, Binder and
Freytag (2013) have also concluded using the British Household Survey a positive
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association like previously but this seemed sustainable and increasing over time, the
more people volunteer.
All of those models were designed to explain in a way some of the reasons why
people would volunteer. The main drawback in this field of research is the lack
of data and the requirement of individual level data. In general, the empirical
implementation of the models built is based on survey data and thus are really
context-specific. That could explain why the question is not widely addressed in
economics.
The interest of our approach is to focus on the extensive margin in the decision
of volunteering (when or whether to volunteer or not to volunteer) rather than the
intensive margin (how much to volunteer) which is widespread in the literature 6 .
Moreover it would allow to uncover which of the two models described above fits
well in developing countries where there are a lot of frictions in the labor market and
where the social networks are sometimes indispensable to get a job or get promoted.
Besides, social norms and religious beliefs which are also predominant could influence
significantly people’s behavior and thus altruism might be thought to matter in the
motives of volunteering.
3 Theoretical framework and Identification
In this section I provide the theoretical support of the analysis and then describe
the identification strategy.
3.1 Theoretical framework
Let’s consider an individual whose preference consists in a combination of selfish-
ness and morality attitudes with the weight attributed to morality being the degree
of morality7.
On the one hand , the consumption motives of volunteering could be seen through
the basic consumer’s optimal behavior. Let’s denote τv the time devoted to voluntary
activities τl , the time allocated to leisure and G the consumption of goods. Volun-
teering is then just an argument of a utility function U(τl, τv, G) with U increasing in
volunteering ( Uv > 0 ). So the utility is simply maximized given G = w(Γ −τl−τv)
with Γ , the total time endowment during a given period. The key assumption
6Although combining both would be interesting as well , but it is out of the scope of this work.
7The extent to which he believes he has to do the right thing in a given situation, see Alger ,
I. & J., W., Weibull (2013).
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here is that the consumer is not a pure homo economicus as regards the consump-
tion of volunteering meaning that her degree of morality should not be naught and
this gives room for significant altruistic behavior in a sense. Hence , from this
framework , one could conjecture that if a welfare premium could be derived from
volunteering irrespective of the opportunity cost incurred by the voluntary activity,
the consumption motives model is validated .That is , the consumption motives
model holds exclusively when a positive effect of volunteering on wellbeing coupled
with a positive effect of income on volunteering are simultaneously observed . Of
course in parallel, there should be no expected external counterpart from the act of
volunteering. The individual in fact does not care because he is in a sense altruist
and really cares for other people well-being without requiring or expecting a direct
counterpart. We come back to this in the identification strategy.
Following the previous analysis, the conjecture here about the identification
strategy about the intrinsic motives is : A positive and significant effect of volun-
teering on wellbeing combined with a higher likelihood of volunteering when income
is increasing would support the intrinsic motives.
On the other hand , the idea behind the investment motives would be accumu-
lation of experience or human capital , the extension of social networks in order to
relax some potential constraints or frictions in the labor market. So like Franz et al
(2004) suggested8 , the following simple dynamic investment model can illustrate the
optimal trajectory of volunteering and serves as a baseline for our second conjecture
in the empirical part . Volunteering for an individual here is just about being an
homo economicus caring only for his own payoffs .
Let’s consider the following basic optimization framework:
max
v(τ), t(τ)
∫ T
0
f(v(τ), s(τ), t(τ))e−rτ dτ
Subject to s˙(τ) = g(v(τ))− ςs(τ)
v(τ) ≤ Γ − t(τ)− l(τ)
and v(τ) <∞;Γ <∞
with Γ the total amount of time endowment at instant τ , l(τ) and t(τ) the time
credit allocated respectively to leisure and to paid jobs . In this framework f(·) is
the individual production function which can be seen as an income generating pro-
cess, v(τ) stands for volunteering amount at time τ and g is the gross investment in
8Model based on Cahuc and Zylberger (2004).
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experience , human capital and network thanks to volunteering .While volunteering
at period τ decreases current marketable production (paid work), it increases the
non-marketable production (free services...) and the underlying experience gained
added to the social capital built in the same period (all of this is embedded here in
s). These external benefits are not only employment status improving (especially
moving from unemployment to employment ) but also offer better prospects for
higher income. ς is the depreciation rate of human capital and social capital (s) at
each period τ mainly due to skill depletion and the breaking off some social links (or
ties) especially during unemployment time . It is thus important that the marginal
gain from volunteering is higher than the depreciation rate for the net gain in human
capital, social networks and experience (s˙) to be positive. It’s argued (franz (2004))
that the optimal trajectory of v(τ) is a hump shaped one. In fact people with low s
tend to volunteer more up to an optimal threshold after which volunteering starts
decreasing for higher s.
Since volunteering in this model is expected to increase human capital , social
networks and experience , it has to be the case that it increases the prospects of
moving from unemployment to employment. Hence the conjecture about the identi-
fication of the investment model would be that volunteering increases the likelihood
of getting employed and thereby offers a prospect for higher income.
3.2 Identification strategy
The theoretical framework described allows to test empirically the validity of the
two conjectures. Concerning the intrinsic motives the individual essentially behaves
as a utility maximizer without being a pure homo-economicus . In that case volun-
teering would be seen as a kind of service which brings some intrisic satisfaction to
the consumer and thus some utility is derived from the act of volunteering per se .
On the other hand, the extrinsic motives make people volunteer in order to increase
their future income and job prospects.
Following this analysis we base the identification strategy on the framework of
those two models. We would thus be testing 3 hypotheses.
Following the consumption model the first hypothesis is :
Hypothesis 1 : Intrinsic motives for volunteering
Volunteering significantly increases people’s well-being and higher income level
makes people more likely to volunteer .
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From the investment model, we formulate the second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2 : Extrinsic motives for volunteering
Volunteering significantly increases the likelihood of moving from unemployment
to employment controlling for education and other relevant covariates. At the same
time it allows people to have higher prospects of income .
Hypothesis 3: A mixture of both
Neither hypothesis 1 nor hypothesis 2 is confirmed separately or exclusively.
In order to test hypothesis 1 the model to be estimated is :
Wellbeingit = β1V olunteeringit + β2Income+ β3Altruism+ controlsit + countryfe
(1)
controls = {education, gender, marital status, age...}
and
V olunteeringit = λ1Incomeit+λ2Altruism+λ3Availability+λ4workimportance+
controlsit + countryfe (2)
controls = {education, gender, marital status, age...}
Availability and work importance would serve as excluded variables in order to iden-
tify properly the system and would be defined in section 5.3. Altruism here is just
capturing a philanthropic behavior and I am controlling this behavior by the willing-
ness to give for general concern . In this framework, I measure it by the willingness
to give part of one’s income for environment (see table 1 in section 1).
I check the validity of the 2nd conjecture about the investment motives by test-
ing whether volunteering is significantly increasing the likelihood of entering into
employment and in parallel whether it is improving income level (hypothesis 2). I
use the following model for this purpose:
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Employment.statusit = θ1V olunteeringit+θ2highest.degree+controlsit+countryfe (3)
and
Incomeit = φ1V olunteeringit + φ2education+ controlsit + countryfe (4)
controls = {gender, marital status, age, health...}
Note that the two previous excluded instruments would still be used here to see
whether it would have been better to estimate the two equations simultaneously or
not.
In either of the models , I make use of probability models framework . All of the
dependent variables are categorical. So depending on the case I use a logit model
(in case of binary dependent variable) , an ordered logit regression in case of a more
than two categories in the dependent variable and an IV-Biprobit (instrumental
variable in a bivariate probit framework) to account for the excluded instruments
and perform a kind of robustness check. After the estimations both the signs of the
relevant coefficients and the magnitudes of the effects recovered from the marginal
effects would allow to perform the tests and discuss the results.
4 Data
The World Values Survey (WVS)9 dataset used in this study is an individual
level survey conducted in 81 countries over 5 waves and 20 years from 1981 to 2011.
We focus here on a bunch of 30 developing countries.
Table 2: Volunteering in Developing countries
(a) wave 4: 1999−2004
Volunteer Number Per cent
No 17,125 70
yes 7,294 30
Total 24,419 100
Source:WVS
(b) wave 5: 2005−2007
Volunteer Number Per cent
No 897 90
yes 103 10
Total 1,000 100
Source:WVS
9Link to the dataset : http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp
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Concerning the variable volunteering for example , table 2 above provides some
statistics for two waves of survey. Volunteering rate is between 10% to 30% of the
sample . More specifically, tables 7, 8 and 9 in annex give more details about who
volunteer depending on the employment status and income level. Two main facts
could be emphasized from those tables. In fact, whatever the employment status
, there is a substantial number of people in voluntary activities and this is even
relatively more pronounced for high income level people as compared to medium
and low income level.
The variable well-being is a composite measure of satisfaction with life and feel-
ing of happiness. Satisfaction with life reveals sustainable and relevant perception
of life (the outcome of an evaluation process including material and social aspi-
rations and achievement10) while happiness would capture emotions (the outcome
of positive experiences, particularly close personal relationship”11). The composite
measure of well-being would be much more sensible and stable. I just adjusted the
scale of ”feeling of happiness” (which is of 4 points) to 10 scale points in order to
weight it in the same way as ”satisfaction with life”. Thus we added negative 2.5
times ”feeling of happiness” to ”satisfaction with life” to calculate the variable well-
being. Note that the 2.5 multiplying the variable ”feeling of happiness” is for the
adjustment to the same point scale and the minus ensures that we have the same
order in both ”feeling of happiness” and ”satisfaction with life”. It’s worth noting
that the composite measure of well-being using both satisfaction with life and hap-
piness with equal weights to both variables as suggested in Inglehart et al (1998)
can be interpreted the same way like satisfaction where the higher the point scale
the better. However the composite indicator of well-being has to be seen on a range
of points scale between -9 (the lowest level) and 7.5 (the highest level). Finally ,
the variable has been recategorized into a 3 scale points variable with low , medium
and high level.
5 Results and discussion
As announced in the identification strategy section , the goal here is to use some
probabilty estimation methods in order to test our different hypotheses. In a first
step , I run the regression without caring for the excluded instruments in both models
meaning a regression equation by equation . In a second step , I consider potential
endogeneity and simulteneity issues and thus heed the excluded instruments.
10Haller and Hadler (2006), P.169
11Ibid.
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5.1 First results for the intrinsic motives
The table 10 in annex shows the first results regarding hypothesis 1. It consists
of a simple ordered logit estimation of the equation (1) in which well-being is the
variable to be explained and a simple logit for the second equation where volunteer-
ing is fitted. The sign on volunteering in both column 1 and 2 is a plus (+) and it
means that people who volunteer , whatever the services they provide through some
professional associations , are more likely to declare they feel happier or more satis-
fied in life as compared to people who do not. At the same time , from column (3)
we have the evidence of a positive effect of switching from lower to higher category
of income on the act of volunteering. The combination of these two facts tends to
support a validation of the first hypothesis in a general setting .
Table 3: Marginal effects on wellbeing and volunteering after the ologit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables WB=low WB=Medium WB=High Volunteer
volunteer -0.0235*** -0.00342*** 0.0269***
(3.23e-06) (8.49e-06) (3.19e-06)
health -0.101*** -0.0147*** 0.116*** -0.00197
(0) (0) (0) (0.598)
income -0.0657*** -0.00958*** 0.0753*** 0.0308***
(0) (0) (0) (0)
altruism -0.0267*** -0.00390*** 0.0306***
(0) (0) (0)
empl stat -0.0263*** -0.00384*** 0.0302*** 0.0220***
(7.38e-08) (3.60e-07) (7.14e-08) (0.00119)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,122 20,122 20,122 19,523
p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Each coefficient in columns 1 ; 2 and 3 represents a predicted probability (a marginal
effect ) of being or not in one of the three categories of the dependent variable well-being given a
change in each covariate .Those marginal effects are computed from the first equation of hypothesis
1 (equation 1) and the underlying ordered logit estimation is on table 10 (columns 1 and 2) in
annex. Column 4 displays the marginal effects from the second equation of hypothesis 1 (equation
2 ) and the underlying simple logit estimation is on table 10, column 3 in annex.
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However this has to be taken cautiously due to possible endogeneity problem of
volunteering which does not have to be true but is worth testing. In fact , happier
people might be more likely to volunteer more and this makes them even happier
whatever their motives (altruism or investment). I address this latter on .
For the moment let’s continue with the first results and check the magnitudes.
In table 3 above , each of the column displays the average effect of volunteering and
other covariates in altering the likelihood of being happy or satisfied with life. In
fact , the first column and the first line of the table show that when a typical agent
volunteers it decreases respectively by 2.35% and 0.3% her likelihood of being in the
low or in the medium category of wellbeing while there is a 2.69% more chance to
fall into the highest level of well-being. On top of those effects of volunteering on
wellbeing , the marginal effects from the second equation of the model designed for
hypothesis 1 is a 3.08% more chance to volunteer when having higher income (col-
umn (4)). The two facts combined would support exclusively the validity of intrinsic
motives for volunteering in the case of no endogeneity of the variable volunteering
and of no evidence of extrinsic motives. It is however worth pointing out that it
might happen that both the intrinsic and the extrinsic motives coexist (hypothesis
3) . The effects of the other variables are in the expected direction.
In the following subsections I first fit all of the equations one by one without
taking into account the excluded instruments and thus. Then using the excluded
instruments , I run again the regression in order to account for potential endogeneity
and simultaneity.
5.2 First results for the extrinsic motives
Table 11 in annex provides the results from the estimation of the second model
built for hypothesis 2. It appears from the 1st column of the table that volunteering
makes people more likely to be employed and at the same time increases income.
More precisely , the table 4 below gives an overview of the magnitude of the effects
just described. Volunteering seems to increase the chance to get employed by 3.2
% on average . Moreover , a volunteer is less likely to be in the low income group
(-2.85%) and has more chance to be in the high income category as compared to
medium income level (2.7% against 0.2%).
The previous effects tend to support the extrinsic motives for volunteering , but
once again one has to be cautious because the two equations of the model estimated
might be simultaneously identified through employment status. So given that the
estimations in columns (1) and (2) are done separately (from equations (3) and (4)
described above in subsection (3.2)) it could be interesting to estimate them simul-
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taneously and see whether the results are altered .
Table 4: Investment motives : marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Employment status Income= low level Income = medium level Income=high level
volunteer 0.0322*** -0.0285*** 0.00165*** 0.0269***
(2.56e-05) (1.75e-06) (4.80e-05) (1.76e-06)
age 0.0572***
(0)
health 0.0264*** -0.0451*** 0.00261*** 0.0425***
(0) (0) (0) (0)
highest deg 0.0278***
(0)
empl stat -0.0560*** 0.00324*** 0.0527***
(0) (1.56e-09) (0)
Observations 20,719 21,593 21,593 21,593
p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source:WVS
Notes: Each coefficient in column 1 represents a predicted probability of being employed (em-
ployment status is binary ) given a change in a covariate. They are computed after a simple logit
estimation of equation 3 (see table 11 column 1). The columns 2; 3 and 4 display the marginal
effects related to equation 4 and the underlying ordered logit ( because income is of 3 categories)
estimation is in column 2 table 10 in annex.
The first results from the simple estimation (without caring for endogeneity or
simultaneity) of the two models point out an ambiguous coexistence of intrinsic and
extrinsic motives.
5.3 Estimation including the excluded instruments
In this section I respectively deal with the consumption model and the investment
model using the excluded instruments.
5.3.1 The consumption motives: An Iv-Biprobit estimation
In order to check whether volunteering is endogenous or not in the first simple
estimation of consumption motives , we recategorized wellbeing into a binary vari-
able and instrumented volunteering by two excluded instruments.
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The first used is ”Availability” or the leisure time someone is able to free or
forego. This variable seems to significantly affect well-being in our context mainly
through volunteering given the potential satisfaction derived from behaving morally
or caring for others and or the work experience gained and not via a direct channel.
Of course this instrument is correlated with volunteering . The second excluded
instrument is the degree of importance people assign to work in their life. It is clear
that people for whom working is important in life are more likely to be tempted to
volunteer and this way could improve their welfare either because they are altruistic
or investing . There is absolutely no reason that work importance affects directly
wellbeing in our model.
In order to run the regressions including the excludded instrument , the variable
wellbeing which is of three scale points has been recategorized into a binary vari-
able to allow the use of the model at hands . Moreover , I am constrained to use
a bivariate probit estimation techniques including the instrumentation because the
suspected endogenous covariate is not continuous but rather binary and this also
applies for the dependent variable .
Table 11 in annex displays both the first and the second stage of the estimation
. The instrument availability is rather a good predictor for volunteering and in the
expected direction while the variable work importance is not . However , the most
important information to derive from this Instrumental variable exercise is that it
would allow to confirm or not the suspected endogeneity of the volunteering.
In fact ”at the bottom of the output is the Wald test of the exogeneity of the
instrumented variables. If the test statistic is not significant, there is not sufficient
information in the sample to reject the null that there is no endogeneity. Then a
regular probit regression may be appropriate”12. In our case , the wald statistic (at
the bottom of table 12 in annex) is not significant meaning that there is no sufficient
information in our model to support the endogeneity of volunteering and the simple
logit or probit estimation is sufficient to significantly isolate the effect of volunteer-
ing on wellbeing .
However as can be seen from table 5 below, the signs from column (1) and (4)
which are the estimation done separately from the two equations related to the
consumption motives model , and the similar estimations from the columns (2) and
(3) to account for potential endogeneity are consistent, except for religion. Moreover
, apart from the fact that the average marginal effect of volunteering is somehow
exaggerated from the Iv-biprobit estimation (column(2)) as compared to the one
12www.stata.com/manuals13/rivprobit.pdf
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from the simple logit (in column (1)) , 6% against 2% , the marginal effect with
respect to income on volunteering is significant and of roughly the same order of
magnitude in both estimations (about 8%).
Table 5: Consumption motives : Marginal effects after the IV-Biprobit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Simple logit Iv-biprobit-2nd stage 1st stage Simple logit
wellbeing wellbeing volunteer volunteer
volunteer 0.0218*** 0.0620**
(0.00107) (0.0121)
health 0.102*** 0.101*** -0.00881** -0.00197
(0) (0) (0.0208) (0.598)
income 0.0825*** 0.0807*** 0.0288*** 0.0308***
(0) (0) (0) (0)
religion 0.0136 0.0196** -0.101*** 0.00419
(0.125) (0.0306) (0) (0.649)
empl stat 0.0375*** 0.0365*** 0.0300*** 0.0220***
(1.73e-09) (7.78e-09) (1.61e-05) (0.00119)
Observations 20,122 19,523 19,523 19,523
p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source:WVS
Notes : wellbeing is recategorized into a binary variable
5.3.2 Investment motives: A Bivariate probit estimation
The robustness check procedure here goes through the consideration of a poten-
tial simultaneity between the two equations for the extrinsic motives ( see equations
(3) and (4)) . Table 13 in annex provides both the first and the second stage es-
timation. From columns (1) and (3) for respectively a simple logit and the second
stage biprobit regression of employment status ; volunteering significantly and in the
same manner increases the likelihood of getting employed. At the same time , the
column (2) and the first stage outcomes also show volunteering affecting income the
same way. Those facts are not surprising since the wald test supports it (the wald
statistic is not significant). Hence the two equations could have been consistently
regressed separately in this framework.
From table 6 below concerning the marginal effects , I still get consistent magni-
tudes with the results just described. In fact from columns (1) and (2) , I have the
same magnitude of the positive and significant effect of volunteering on the likeli-
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hood of getting employed (around 3%).
Table 6: Investment motives : biprobit marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simple probit Simple probit biprobit-2nd equation biprobit-1st equation
VARIABLES Employment status Income Employment status Income
volunteer 0.0317*** 0.0250*** 0.0317*** 0.0254***
(3.76e-05) (0.000411) (3.80e-05) (0.000650)
age 0.0535*** 0.00175
(0) (0.101)
health 0.0272*** 0.0443*** 0.0272*** 0.0430***
(0) (0) (0) (0)
highest deg 0.0280*** 0.0280***
(0) (0)
empl stat 0.0647*** 0.0702
(0) (0.104)
Observations 20,719 21,593 20,719 20,719
p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source:WVS
Similarly , columns (2) and (4) show a 2.5% increase in the likelihood of having
higher income level prospects .
The analysis provides evidence of a coexistence of both intrinsic and extrinsic
motives when the decision to volunteer is made and the figures 1 and 2 give a
quick graphical overview of all the results. Without necessarily being a specificity of
developing countries , it is clear that morality , social cohesion and norms , religion,
beliefs and the predominance of an informal regulation of social tie could force people
to care for others without necessarily expecting a direct counterpart but rather and
more often enjoy the act of volunteering per se13. However , at the same time
the numerous frictions in labor markets and the lack or even the absence of social
security and insurance systems especially regarding employment make most of the
unemployed people more likely to be volunteering in a way to relax those constraints
by not only building social networks but also gaining experience in order to more
easily seize jobs opportunities.
13A simple example which I experienced myself in Africa as compared to what I have seen in
Europe is that there are a bunch of services like sweeping churches , mosques... for which people
(even including myself !) are pleased to volunteer for and it is strictly for free while those services
are charged as any other marketable ones in Europe. There are many other examples , but this
comparison is not the purpose of the work, however it clarifies in a sense the results.
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6 Conclusion
The results of this work support an ambiguous coexistence of both intrinsic
and extrinsic motives for volunteering at the extensive margins. It is not clear
which motives dominate in the pool of developing countries considered here. While
considering only the extensive margin (whether or not to volunteer) is rather weak
and probably insufficient to really identify and distinguish the dominant effects,
it gives a sketch of what could complement the numerous works on the extensive
margins (how much to volunteer). One challenge faced in this work is that it required
a lot of information but the dataset was missing some data and included mainly
discrete variables. Better approaches for this work would require to have income
and volunteering (in terms of hours for example) to be continuous in order to have
enough variation and thus a better robustness check strategy. Moreover, an attempt
to better control for the social constraints (punishment and/or reward) and the labor
market frictions instead of grouping them as simple countries’ fixed effects could be
more informative and help to better clarify the motives of volunteering.
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7 ANNEXES
Table 7: Employment status and volunteering in developing countries
volunteer
Employment status No yes Total
unemployed 8,036 2,862 10,898
employed 7,550 3,716 11,266
Total 15,586 6,578 22,164
Source:WVS
Table 8: Volunteering by employment status
(a) Developing countries
Volunteer
Employment status No yes Total
Full time 5,377 2,471 7,848
Part time 1,233 610 1,843
Self employed 2,074 948 3,022
Retired 1,578 392 1,970
Housewife 3,022 710 3,732
Students 1,491 861 2,352
Unemployed 2,650 929 3,579
Other 463 342 805
Total 17,888 7,263 25,151
Source:WVS
(b) Developed countries
volunteer
Employment status No yes Total
Full time 3,313 1,153 4,466
Part time 587 289 876
Self employed 429 150 579
Retired 1,204 324 1,528
Housewife 1,062 164 1,226
Students 449 302 751
Unemployed 660 141 801
Other 93 17 110
Total 7,797 2,540 10,337
Source:WVS
Table 9: Volunteering by income scale point in developing countries
Volunteer
Income level No yes Total
Low 5,408 1,860 7,268
Medium 6,084 2,515 8,599
High 4,279 2,354 6,633
Total 15,771 6,729 22,500
Source:WVS
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Table 10: Consumption motives: Wellbeing and Volunteering output
(1) (2) (3)
well-being well-being volunteer
volunteer 0.157*** 0.151***
(0.000) (0.000)
gender -0.199*** -0.241*** 0.172***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age -0.0337*** -0.0425*** -0.0477***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age2 0.000459*** 0.000561*** 0.000423***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
health 0.654*** 0.651*** -0.0116
(0.000) (0.000) (0.598)
income 0.434*** 0.424*** 0.181***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
religion 0.0824* 0.0856** 0.0246
(0.055) (0.047) (0.649)
altruism 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.197***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
empl stat 0.170*** 0.129***
(0.000) (0.001)
availability 0.505***
(0.000)
work importance 0.0378
(0.251)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
N 20122 20122
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source:WVS
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Table 11: Investment motives : Simple ologit estimation
(1) (2)
empl stat income
volunteer 0.158*** 0.151***
(0.000) (0.000)
age 0.281*** 0.0132***
(0.000) (0.007)
age2 -0.00329*** -0.000101*
(0.000) (0.063)
health 0.130*** 0.239***
(0.000) (0.000)
highest deg 0.137*** 0.341***
(0.000) (0.000)
availability 0.114***
(0.000)
work importance 0.391***
(0.000)
empl stat 0.297***
(0.000)
educ 0.0454
(0.407)
gender -0.0454*
(0.097)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
N 20719 21593
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 12: Consumption motives : testing for endogeneity of volunteering
(1) (2) (3)
wellbeing wellbeing volunteer
Simple-logit Iv-biprobit-2nd stage Simple-logit
volunteer 0.146*** 0.244**
(0.001) (0.011)
age -0.0548*** -0.0303*** -0.0477***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age2 0.000674*** 0.000379*** 0.000423***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
gender -0.253*** -0.156*** 0.172***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
health 0.688*** 0.395*** -0.0116
(0.000) (0.000) (0.598)
income 0.554*** 0.314*** 0.181***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
religion 0.0916 0.0769** 0.0246
(0.125) (0.030) (0.649)
empl stat 0.252*** 0.142*** 0.129***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
altruism 0.169*** 0.0786*** 0.197***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(0.270) (0.245) (0.000)
availability 0.505***
(0.000)
work importance 0.0378
(0.251)
cons 1.764*** 0.885*** 2.095***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
First stage
volunteer
availability 0.287***
(0.000)
work importance 0.0241
(0.153)
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Table 12: Consumption motives : testing for endogeneity of volunteering
(continued)
(1) (2) (3)
volunteer
First stage-Continued
age -0.0111***
(0.002)
age2 0.0000527
(0.203)
gender 0.113***
(0.000)
health -0.0278**
(0.018)
income 0.0894***
(0.000)
religion -0.315***
(0.000)
empl stat 0.0905***
(0.000)
altruism 0.145***
(0.000)
cons 0.954***
(0.000)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
athrho
cons -0.0948
(for Wald test of exogeneity) (0.114)
N 20122 19523 19523
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source:WVS
22
Table 13: Investment motives : Biprobit estimation
(1) (2) (3)
(Simple probit) (Simple probit) (biprobit 2nd equation)
employment status income employment status
volunteer 0.0935*** 0.0800*** 0.0935***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age 0.158*** 0.00560 0.158***
(0.000) (0.101) (0.000)
age2 -0.00183*** -0.0000437 -0.00183***
(0.000) (0.252) (0.000)
health 0.0801*** 0.142*** 0.0801***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
highest deg 0.0824*** 0.189*** 0.0824***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
availability 0.0702*** 0.0703***
(0.000) (0.000)
work importance 0.239*** 0.239***
(0.000) (0.000)
empl stat 0.207***
(0.000)
educ 0.0821**
(0.036)
gender -0.0254
(0.200)
cons -2.475*** -0.494*** -2.475***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
biprobit First- equation(see next page)
Income
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Table 13: Investment motives : biprobit (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
First stage-Continued
Income
volunteer 0.0819***
(0.001)
empl stat 0.226
(0.106)
educ 0.0805**
(0.044)
highest deg 0.191***
(0.000)
age 0.00520
(0.505)
age2 -0.0000384
(0.665)
gender -0.0255
(0.210)
health 0.138***
(0.000)
cons -0.500***
(0.000)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
athrho
cons -0.00710
(for Wald test of exogeneity) (0.933)
N 20719 21593 20719
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source:WVS
Notes : Income is recategorized into a binary variable
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Figure 1: The marginal effects
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Figure 2: The marginal effects
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